On school choice and test-based accountability. by Betebenner, Damian W. et al.
 Readers are free to copy, display, and distribute this article, as long as the work is 
attributed to the author(s) and Education Policy Analysis Archives, it is distributed for non-
commercial purposes only, and no alteration or transformation is made in the work. More details of this 
Creative Commons license are available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/. All 
other uses must be approved by the author(s) or EPAA. EPAA is published jointly by the Colleges of 
Education at Arizona State University and the University of South Florida. Articles are indexed by H.W. 
Wilson & Co. Send commentary to Casey Cobb (casey.cobb@uconn.edu) and errata notes to Sherman 
Dorn (epaa-editor@shermandorn.com). 
EDUCATION  POLICY  ANALYSIS  ARCHIVES 
A peer-reviewed scholarly journal 
Editor: Sherman Dorn 
College of Education 
 University of South Florida 
Volume 13  Number 41 October 8, 2005 ISSN 1068–2341 
 
 
On School Choice and Test-Based Accountability 
 
Damian W. Betebenner 
Boston College 
 
Kenneth R. Howe 
Samara S. Foster 
University of Colorado 
 
Citation: Betebenner, D. W., Howe, K. R., & Foster, S. S. (2005). On school choice and 
test-based accountability. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 13(41). Retrieved [date] 
from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v13n41/. 
Abstract 
Among the two most prominent school reform measures currently being 
implemented in The United States are school choice and test-based accountability. 
Until recently, the two policy initiatives remained relatively distinct from one 
another. With the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), a 
mutualism between choice and accountability emerged whereby school choice 
complements test-based accountability. In the first portion of this study we present 
a conceptual overview of school choice and test-based accountability and explicate 
connections between the two that are explicit in reform implementations like 
NCLB or implicit within the market-based reform literature in which school choice 
and test-based accountability reside. In the second portion we scrutinize the 
connections, in particular, between school choice and test-based accountability 
using a large western school district with a popular choice system in place. Data 
from three sources are combined to explore the ways in which school choice and 
test-based accountability draw on each other: state assessment data of children in 
the district, school choice data for every participating student in the district choice 
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program, and a parental survey of both participants and non-participants of choice 
asking their attitudes concerning the use of school report cards in the district. 
Results suggest that choice is of benefit academically to only the lowest achieving 
students, choice participation is not uniform across different ethnic groups in the 
district, and parents’ primary motivations as reported on a survey for participation 
in choice are not due to test scores, though this is not consistent with choice 
preferences among parents in the district. As such, our results generally confirm 
the hypotheses of choice critics more so than advocates. 
Keywords: school choice; accountability; student testing. 
Introduction 
During the last two decades, The United States has witnessed a sweeping tide of reform 
efforts directed toward the improvement of public education. Largely initiated by the seminal report 
A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education [NCEE], 1983), the quest for 
improved education in the United States ventured in numerous directions—from the varied 
curriculum wars of the 1980s to the standards based reform efforts of the 1990s. With 
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), referred to as the 
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), no abatement is apparent in the desire to reform education at 
the beginning of the 21st century. Two reform initiatives currently dominate public education policy: 
Test-based accountability and parental choice. Given their inclusion in NCLB, both are likely to 
pervade discussions concerning education reform for years to come and to have lasting effects on 
public education in The United States. 
NCLB is without precedent in both scope and direction, employing test-based accountability 
and school choice as the fundamental mechanisms to engender school improvement. The legislation 
implements this accountability-choice mutualism along two lines: First, NCLB encourages the 
expansion of school choice by allowing students attending Title I schools to transfer to another 
public school (including charter schools) if their school has been identified as being in need of 
school improvement, corrective action, or restructuring as defined by the accountability components 
of the law. NCLB provides technical assistance for schools failing to make adequate progress and 
also requires school districts to provide free transportation for students who choose to attend other 
district schools. Second, NCLB requires statewide assessments in grades 3–8 in reading and math, 
and science testing in at least one grade in elementary, middle, and high school. Furthermore, 
beginning in the 2002–03 school-year, states were required to provide report cards for each of their 
public schools. 
In simplest terms, the rationale for combining choice and accountability is that the two 
complement one another: (1) accountability facilitates parental choice by supplying parents with 
information (in the form of school report cards) they need to make informed choices, and (2) choice 
facilitates accountability by fostering competition for enrollment. With the choice/accountability 
nexus as the foundation, our intent in this study is twofold: First, we wish to analyze the theory that 
brings accountability and choice together under one federal policy. In particular we wish to unpack 
the rationale linking choice and accountability using the language of market-based reforms and make 
explicit the manner in which accountability and parental choice are thought to complement one 
another. Second, using data compiled from a large western school district, we ascertain whether 
market-based reforms that link accountability and choice function as prescribed. We begin with a 
brief review of market-based education reforms vis-à-vis school choice. 
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Market-based School Reforms 
Milton Friedman (1962) is widely credited with originating the idea of reforming public 
education via school choice. He proposed a market-driven scheme in which public funding and 
administrative authority would be transferred to private schools where parents redeemed their 
government supplied vouchers. Various other voucher proposals have followed that have added the 
overall improvement of public education to Friedman’s more modest goal of increased efficiency 
(e.g., Chubb & Moe, 1990). A few limited voucher programs have been implemented, with 
Milwaukee’s “Parental Choice Program” being the most long-lived and carefully studied (see Witte, 
2001). The Florida A+ program (a hybrid system, which includes both private and public schools) 
has gained considerable attention of late (Greene, 2001). Since vouchers were declared constitutional 
by the United States Supreme Court in 2002, a number of states are in the process of considering 
legislation that would open the door to vouchers in their states. Colorado, for example, recently 
passed a state voucher program that allocates funding to disadvantaged children from kindergarten 
through grade 12 whenever their local school district demonstrates low academic performance. The 
program was recently struck down by the Colorado State Supreme Court. But proponents intend to 
reintroduce a voucher bill that will pass constitutional muster. It’s likely that other states will follow 
Colorado’s lead in using choice as a major initiative to reform public education. 
Not all proponents of public school choice embrace a market rationale, but this rationale 
now sets the terms of the debate (Hess, 2002). Proponents argue that market regulation is far better 
than bureaucratic government regulation (Chubb & Moe, 1990). The market mechanism of parental 
choice allows funds for schools to follow students and creates a system of competition among 
schools. They argue that this competition provides schools with a mandate to improve or risk losing 
money and even closure (Greene, Peterson, & Du, 1997; Hess, Maranto, & Milliman, 1999; Hess & 
Leal, 2001; Merrifield, 2001). The result is an incentive for schools to provide better services 
(through, for example, innovation, specialization, efficiency, etc.) and to increase student 
achievement. Other supporters contend that such programs can serve to promote equity (Coons & 
Sugarman, 1978). In general, those who see public choice as a means of promoting equity observe 
that parents have long chosen schools by choosing their place of residence (Henig & Sugarman, 
1999). Parents’ incomes and social positions thus largely determine their power to choose. A choice 
policy that removes attendance boundaries permits students to choose schools independent of the 
price of houses in the neighborhoods in which they live. It thus provides all parents with choice, and 
also promises to promote diversity in schools 
Critics of market-driven school choice question whether it can improve achievement overall. 
They contend that the market may simply redistribute students as a result of “skimming,” where 
certain schools’ mean achievement increases only because other schools’ mean achievement 
decreases (e.g., Carnoy, 2000). Critics also contend that by introducing competition, cooperation that 
currently exists between teachers and schools will be sacrificed. The majority of criticism for market-
based reforms like school choice falls on the issue of equity, charging that such reforms are much 
more likely to exacerbate inequity than to mitigate it. School choice plans, for example, typically 
make no provision to protect students from being harmed while schools are declining, before they 
are reconstituted (e.g., Arsen, Plank & Sykes, 2000; Lauder & Hughs, 1999). School choice can also 
result in stratification by ethnicity and income (e.g., Cobb & Glass, 1999; Howe, Eisenhart & 
Betebenner, 2001), exclude special needs students (e.g., Arsen et al., 2000; Rothstein, 1999; Zollers, 
2000), and thereby force other public schools to carry the burden of accommodating the needs of 
more difficult to teach students. Finally, critics also claim that there is inequality among parents in 
their capacity to choose because certain parents may lack the information needed to participate in 
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meaningful deliberation, and others may lack trust in authorities (Fuller & Elmore, 1996; Wells, 
1993). 
In a comprehensive overview of the effects of school competition and educational 
outcomes, Belfield and Levin (2002) conducted a review of research from the United States in order 
to determine “to what extent, and according to what measures of output, does increased 
competition improve educational quality” (2002, pp. 279–280). The criteria for the articles chosen 
were that they must address educational outcomes and competitive pressures across large markets 
and contain an analysis on the basis of large-scale, cross-sectional data sets. Competition was 
constructed in terms of greater school choice for parents and students, and educational outcomes 
were mostly measured in terms of standardized test scores, as well as graduation/attainment, 
expenditures/efficiency, teacher quality, students’ post-school wages, and local housing prices. They 
identified about 40 relevant empirical studies and determined that the research “shows reasonably 
consistent evidence of a link between competition (choice) and educational quality” (p. 297). In 
other words, they found a positive correlation between increased competition and educational 
outcomes/quality, but the actual effects were “substantively modest” (p. 297). They raise caution in 
using these findings to support policies to promote greater competition among schools. They 
suggest that the benefits of increased competition must be set against any additional generated costs 
to justify specific policy approaches. They write, “The benefits of competition…should not be 
exaggerated. … a number of them may in fact be the ‘same’ benefit, but calculated in different ways” 
(p. 296). Additionally, they warn that equity issues stemming from increased competition must be 
considered since “market systems rank poorly against equity criteria (e.g., by showing greater 
segregation and partitioning of student groups)” (Belfield & Levin, 2002, p. 296–297). 
School Choice and Test-based Accountability 
Despite their marriage in NCLB, school choice and test-based accountability were not 
originally envisioned as complementary policy initiatives. Their paths toward policy prominence 
have been different and often uneven. Though the roots of both reside in the 1960s, it was test-
based accountability that first gained a foothold under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965. With its implementation more than three decades ago, large scale testing has 
been the primary means of evaluating program efficacy and the determination of federal support for 
the education of low achieving students in poor neighborhoods (Heubert & Hauser, 1999). Since 
then, student testing for accountability purposes has only grown in prominence. 
The mid-1980s marked an expansion in the use of students’ standardized test results for 
accountability purposes (Linn, 2000, 2001; National Research Council (NRC), 1999). In 1986, 33 
states required some form of minimum competency testing of its students (Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1992). Following the Charlottesville Summit in 1989, state and national leaders 
launched a more ambitious conception of accountability based upon standards-based reforms. The 
tests used for this new system of accountability were to be aligned to world-class standards and were 
intended to be more intellectually challenging than were those of the 1980s. As the 1990s unfolded, 
standards-based accountability became the “touchstone” for state governance, as states moved away 
from judging schools in terms of inputs (Elmore, Ablemann, & Fuhrman, 1996) and focused on 
results. By the mid-1990s, for example, test based requirements for high school graduation existed in 
18 states (Bond, Braskamp, & Roeber, 1996). 
Toward the latter half of the 1990s, a subtle yet important shift in test-based accountability 
occurred: the results of assessments began to be distributed as broadly as possible to the general 
public. The primary vehicle for providing this information has been “school report cards”. By 2001, 
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27 states had implemented some form of school report cards as part of their accountability systems 
(Orlofsky & Olson, 2001), and, as mentioned previously, report cards are mandated by NCLB. Test 
results are the primary ingredient of the report cards, which also include information such as safety, 
class demographics, graduation and dropout rates, student mobility, and information on student 
teacher ratios (Goertz, Duffy, & Carlson-LeFloch, 2000; Education Commission of the States, 
[ECS], 1999). Today, school report cards are available online, from the district, and are often 
published in local papers. 
The rationale underlying support for test-based accountability—whether in the 1960s or 
currently—is that it enables school improvement by tying rewards and sanctions to measurable 
outcomes as defined by standardized test scores. Whereas school administrators have a great deal of 
power to alter schools based upon test results, parents, regardless of what information is available to 
them, have been largely powerless to implement school level change. Thus, in order to extend the 
rationale underlying support for test-based accountability to situations where parents become the 
primary consumers of the testing results, parents need to have at their disposal some means by 
which to effect change upon the school. Giving parents the choice to determine what school their 
child attends is one such means. 
Some early studies (e.g., Wells, 1993; Wells & Crane, 1992) suggest that only savvy and 
powerful parents avail themselves of accountability information, and that they use it to promote only 
their own children’s interests. More recent studies (e.g., Schneider, Teske & Marshal, 2000) concur 
that only a relatively small group of activist parents use such information, but go onto suggest that 
the behavior of these parents (even if self-interested) produces overall improvement. To date, no 
studies have been conducted on the universal school report card requirements of the type required 
by NCLB—in which all parents receive accountability information, not just those who actively seek 
it out—to address fundamental questions such as: What kinds of parents use the information 
provided, for what purposes, and to what effects? 
The debate over public school choice is currently driven by a collection of isolated and 
conflicting studies. In their recent comprehensive review of the existing empirical evidence, Gill, 
Timpane, Ross, and Brewer (2001) assert that no general conclusions are warranted with regard to 
the efficacy of school choice programs. The authors cite two major shortcomings with regard to 
existing research on school choice: (1) Current research is of the “black box” variety—not delving 
deeply into how choice affects the actual operation of the school and merely focusing on inputs and 
outputs, and (2) current research has focused on programs that have been operating for a relatively 
short period of time with few participants. Another shortcoming is that the conflicting studies have 
examined different educational policy contexts or, in the case of Cobb and Glass (1999) versus 
Hoxby (2001), used different data and analysis methods to examine the same context. 
The most contentious issue for school choice policies historically—and that now extends to 
policies such as NCLB that integrate choice and accountability—is their effect on patterns of school 
enrollments by race/ethnicity, income, and special education. Some scholars have argued on behalf 
of choice—for vouchers targeted at low-income students, in particular—that it provides a means by 
which to increase racial integration (e.g., Greene, 1999), but this claim has been disputed (e.g., 
Reardon & Yun, 2002). The effects of choice on patterns of enrollment, it would seem, are highly 
dependent on the details of specific policies and the social and historical context in which they 
operate (e.g., Gorard, et al. 2001, Wells, 1998). Several studies of comprehensive choice programs 
(i.e., programs not confined to targeted vouchers) have supported the more modest claim that while 
choice may not increase integration neither does it increase stratification (e.g., Gorard, et al.; Hoxby, 
2001). This conclusion has been disputed, however, by studies where choice has increased 
stratification (e.g., Carnoy, 2000; Cobb & Glass, 1999; Fiske & Ladd, 2000; Howe, et al. 2001). 
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Another family of studies of the effects of choice has focused on the academic achievement 
of students enrolled in choice schools (e.g., charter schools and means-tested vouchers). No general 
conclusions have emerged regarding whether choice schools outperform assigned public schools 
with comparable students. Moreover, these studies are limited because they fail to examine the 
effects of choice policy on students in the system remaining in assigned neighborhood schools. A 
comprehensive evaluation must also include the effect of choice on achievement (positive or 
negative) of students remaining in assigned schools (e.g., Gill, et al. 2001; Hoxby, 2001) 
Several recent studies have adopted this more comprehensive approach. For example, 
Gorard, Fitz, and Taylor (2001), Greene (2001), and Hoxby (2001) have each produced empirical 
studies supporting the argument that competitive pressures created by choice policies (in the form 
of charter schools and/or vouchers) foster improved achievement overall, inclusive of low 
performing schools. Although these studies are an advance over the kinds of studies described 
previously, they have important limitations with respect to the kinds of policies examined vis-à-vis 
NCLB-like policies. In particular, each was based on school or district level data (as opposed to 
student level data) with only the Gorard et al. study employing longitudinal data. 
The Current Study 
Following recent studies, the goal of this study is to examine school choice and test-based 
accountability together in an empirical fashion so as to provide a more comprehensive report on 
each and a more insightful synthesis of market-based reforms in general. To this end our study 
addresses questions in three areas: 
School choice and student achievement. An outcome suggested by much of the school choice 
literature is that students participating in a choice program will outperform their counterparts who 
do not. Our study investigates this question and also includes the effect of school choice on 
achievement of students not participating in choice and remaining in their neighborhood schools. 
School choice and patterns of student enrollment. Another set of analyses in this study focus 
on the nature of the students and schools participating in school choice. Analyses here fall into two 
broad categories: (1) what are the characteristics of students participating in school choice, and (2) 
what are the characteristics of the schools that are most desirable in terms of choice? 
Parents’ use of accountability information. Data on achievement and the movements of 
students within a district allowing for choice is crucial to understanding how achievement and 
choice interact. But it is the dissemination of achievement data to parents that is at the heart of the 
school choice/test-based accountability mutualism. To include this component in our study we 
surveyed parents both participating and not participating in choice and asked them about their use 
of school report cards and other information with regard to beliefs about their children’s schools. 
Method 
The location for the present study is a large western school district with an approximate 
enrollment of 27,500 students. Historically, the quality of the district’s schools has ranged from very 
good to excellent. School choice has existed in the district since 1961. The choice program in the 
district, called open enrollment, allows parents from both inside and outside the district to send their 
child to any school in the district in which there is space available after enrollment by neighborhood 
children. By the mid 1990s, spurred by parents who were unhappy with the district’s implementation 
of the “middle school philosophy” or who complained about a perceived lack of emphasis on 
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academics in the district more generally, various choice options began to proliferate. Coincident with 
these developments, a new school board sympathetic to choice was elected, and the superintendent 
responsible for the middle school philosophy resigned. This was also a time when the school choice 
movement began to accelerate at both the state and national levels. 
As open enrollment expanded in the district, four choice options were added to the 
traditional option of enrolling in any neighborhood school on a space-available basis: (1) focus 
schools which offer a particular curricular focus; (2) neighborhood focus schools which offer the 
standard district curriculum; (3) strand schools which offer the standard district curriculum alongside 
a different curricular strand; and (4) charter schools, whose accountability to the district is specified 
by a contract. In 1999–2000, 21 of 57 district schools had incorporated one of the types of choice 
options just described.1. This compares with only five such schools providing such choice in 1994–
95, all emphasizing either bilingual or experiential education. Thus, between 1994–95 and 1999–
2000, 16 additional articulated choice schools were added, half of which adopted the mission of an 
explicit emphasis on academic rigor and college preparation. Core Knowledge was most prominent 
among the new options provided with five schools adopting it. Currently, more than 25 percent of 
students now take advantage of open enrollment to attend the district schools other than those 
assigned to them by attendance area. 
Concurrent with the boom in school choice in the district the state began a statewide testing 
program. Implemented in 1997, the program tested 4th grade students in reading and writing. The 
program has since expanded and currently tests students from 3rd to 10th grade in reading and 
writing, from 5th to 10th grade in mathematics, and science in the 8th grade. For the past three years, 
annual test results as well as numerous other data associated with each school are tabulated by the 
state department of education and reported to the public as school accountability reports (SAR). 
These reports are available to the public from a number of different sources including local 
newspapers and both the district and state education websites. 
Whereas the effects of school choice are typically hard to isolate, the district considered here 
is a relatively closed system where schools must compete for enrollment from the same pool of 
students. Thus, the district provides an ideal setting to scrutinize the broad assertions leveled by 
proponents and skeptics of school choice in particular and market-based reforms in general. Even 
so, there are a number of confounding factors to be considered before any actual analysis is 
performed. The ideal “experimental” situation would provide for a pretest, a treatment consisting of 
the parents choosing (or not choosing) which school their child will attend, and post-tests to see 
what the results of choosing are. The two primary components of such an analysis are student 
assessment and parental choice data. Limitations in the availability and nature of such data require  
that only a small subset of all students in the district be used in the analysis of school choice 
and academic achievement. 
Based upon previous school choice research in the district (Howe et al., 2001), we identify 
two groups of parents participating in choice in the district: Parents whose children are exercising 
choice between school level and parents whose children are exercising choice within school level. 
Children participating in choice between school levels are children who are enrolling in either 
kindergarten, 6th grade, or 9th grade and thus are, overall, transitioning into a new elementary, middle, 
or high schools.2 Choice exercised within school level occurs when children switch elementary, 
middle or high schools in mid-stream. These two groups of parents indicated fundamentally 
                                                 
1 One of two K–8 schools, 11 of 33 elementary schools, 5 of 13 middle schools, and 4 of 9 high 
schools. 
2 The schools in the district under study are primarily K–5 elementary, 6–8 middle, and 9–12 high 
schools. There are two schools designated as K–8. 
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different motivations for participating in the district choice program. Within school level parents 
often exercised choice in the hopes of alleviating specific difficulties that their child was having at 
their current school. Thus, the rationale for participating in choice for these parents was highly 
idiosyncratic. By contrast, between school levels parents, particularly at the kindergarten and 6th 
grade levels, had more homogeneous concerns centered around their child attending the highest 
quality elementary or middle school available. In addition, the great majority of choice participants, 
75 percent, were between school levels. 
Among the between school level parents exercising choice, further limitations exist. There 
are numerous parents who enroll their child in kindergarten but those children are not subject to 
pre-testing and thus do not allow for any analysis to be performed concerning the results of choice. 
The ideal group of children for analysis is the group of children making the transition from 
elementary to middle school in the district: Academic measures exist which allow for a pre-post 
comparison, they are numerous, and their parents motivations for participating in choice (i.e., 
wanting their child to attend the best middle school possible) are relatively homogeneous. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the analyses performed here concern students matriculating from the 5th grade 
in 2000–01 to the 6th grade in 2001–02. Data for the study came from three sources: district 
assessment data, district choice records, and a parent survey of beliefs about school report cards: 
Assessment data. Test data for all students in the district from the inception of the statewide 
testing program were provided by the district. Assessment data were pared to only include 5th and 6th 
grade students in the district during the 2000–01 and 2001–02 academic years, respectively. Tests in 
reading and mathematics were given to students in those grades and in those years. 
Choice data. School choice records were provided by the district for analysis. These records 
include data regarding 3 ranked school choices, as well as the neighborhood school the student 
would normally attend. After substantial data cleaning, these records were combined with the test 
data when a matching student record could be found. After matching, 1,961 cases remained for 
analysis. 
Survey data. A telephone survey was administered in spring 2003 to elicit parental beliefs 
about the school report cards. Two populations of parents were identified: The population of 
parents sending their child to their neighborhood school (non-choosers) and the population of 
parents participating in the choice program. A stratified random sample was constructed using 
location within district and whether the parent’s child was entering kindergarten, sixth, or ninth 
grade. The total number of chooser and non-chooser respondents was 200 and 202 respectively. 
Because survey respondents were guaranteed anonymity, no linking of parent to student data was 
possible. 
The merged assessment and choice data was used to examine questions regarding students 
achievement as well as examining patterns of choice based enrollment. Survey data was used to 
assess parent attitudes towards the school report cards in the district. The methodology employed to 
address each of the three areas follows. 
School Choice and Student Achievement 
To quantify the academic value of choice with respect to student achievement, we employed 
a series of multilevel growth models (Goldstein, 2003; Singer & Willett, 2003). In general, the model 
employs three levels: Occasion k (level 1) within Student j (level 2) within School k (level 3). Within 
this three level structure a series of four nested models were analyzed: (1) an unconditional means 
model; (2) an unconditional growth model with no fixed effects; (3) an unconditional growth model 
taking account of whether or not the student is a participant in choice or not; and (4) an 
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unconditional growth model taking account of both student participation in choice and initial 
academic ability. Models were examined for both reading and mathematics. 
The unconditional means model, sometimes referred to as the empty model, partitions 
variance between the three levels of the model and is employed as a baseline with which to compare 
later more complicated models. The model is given in composite form in Equation 1. The equation 
partitions the math/reading scale score into school (ν00k), student (ξ0jk), and occasion (εijk) 
components. 
 
Yijk = γ000 + ν00k + ξ0jk + εijk (1) 
 
The unconditional growth model fits a linear trajectory to each student in the data set. 
Because there are only two years of data currently available, there will be no residual error at level 
one due to a perfect fit. Two unconditional growth models are of interest: A growth model which 
sets growth to differ between students but is fixed between schools and a growth model allowing 
growth to vary between both students and schools. The purpose of examining the two models is to 
determine whether the more parsimonious model which fixes growth across schools is sufficient to 
model the data. Equation 2 presents the unconditional growth model allowing for slopes to vary 
across individuals but fixes growth across schools. Equation 3 allows growth to vary across both 
individuals and schools. The residuals ν00k, ξ0jk, and εijk, are identical to those defined in the 
unconditional means model of Equation 1. The residuals ξ1jk and ν1k are residuals for slope at levels 2 
and 3, respectively 
 
Yijk =  γ000 + γ100(GRADEijk − 5) + ν00k + ξ0jk + εijk + ξ1jk(GRADEijk − 5) (2)  
 
Yijk =  γ000 +γ100(GRADEijk − 5) + ν00k + ξ0jk + εijk  + 
 ν1k (GRADEijk − 5) + ξ1jk(GRADEijk − 5) (3)  
 
To model the effects of choice on achievement, a fixed effect is added to the unconditional 
growth model. The fixed effect has three levels depending upon whether the student did not 
participate in school choice, participated in school choice and accepted their enrollment at a school 
of their choosing, or participated in school choice but attended their assigned neighborhood school. 
Based upon the results of Model 2 versus Model 3, growth is allowed to vary across both individuals 
and schools. We consider two models in this context: A parsimonious model accounting for choice 
that sets all choice groups’ growth rates to be equal and a model that allows for growth rates to vary 
between choice groups. Equation 4 provides the equation used to estimate the choice effects while 
fixing growth rates between groups. Equation 5 is the equation allowing for different growth rates 
for the three choice groups. 
 
Yijk = γ000 + γ010CHOICEj + γ100(GRADEijk − 5) +  ν00k + ξ0jk + εijk  
 +  ν1k(GRADEijk − 5) + ξ1jk(GRADEijk − 5) (4)  
 
 
Yijk = γ000 + γ010CHOICEj + γ100(GRADEijk − 5) +  
  γ110(GRADEijk − 5)CHOICEj +  
  ν00k + ξ0jk + εijk +  
  ν1k(GRADEijk − 5) + ξ1jk(GRADEijk − 5) (5)  
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 13 No. 41 10 
The final multilevel model investigating the effects of choice on academic achievement 
incorporates a further fixed effect indicating the quartile of the student on the initial measure. The 
purpose of this is to control for initial ability since choosers are generally higher performing students 
in this district than non-choosers and regression toward the mean is likely to affect the attribution of 
growth rates to the choice groups. The fully crossed model allowing for initial status quartile and 
choice group is given in Equation 6. 
 
Yijk = γ000 + γ010CHOICEj + γ020QUARTILEj + γ021QUARTILEj · CHOICEj + 
  γ100(GRADEijk − 5) + γ110(GRADEijk − 5)CHOICEj + 
  γ120(GRADEijk − 5)QUARTILEj +  
  γ121(GRADEijk − 5)QUARTILEj · CHOICEj +  
  γ021 + ν00k + ξ0jk + εijk +  
 ν1k(GRADEijk − 5) + ξ1jk(GRADEijk − 5)  (6)  
School Choice and Patterns of Student Enrollment 
Analyses on choice based student enrollment fall into two categories: First, we investigate 
what factors are most likely to predict whether a student is a participant in choice or not. Next, we 
investigate what are the characteristics of schools that draw people via the choice program. The 
purpose is to look at patterns of enrollment due to choice both in terms of the students and in terms 
of the schools.  To analyze choice patterns associated with students, we employ a two-level logistic 
regression model using chooser/non-chooser as the dichotomous outcome variable (Snijders & 
Bosker, 1999). In this setting, level 1 represents the student and level 2 represents the 5th grade 
school the student was attending when they applied to be part of the choice program. One of the 
benefits of employing the two level design is that it allows for the modeling of between school 
variation which is known to exist (i.e., students are much more likely participate in choice in some 
elementary schools than in others). Like with the analysis of achievement and choice, a series of 
models is used to isolate the most prominent factors associated with choice participation. 
We begin with the unconditional means model (or empty model). This model, given in 
Equation 7, expresses the log-odds of the probability of being a chooser in school j, logit(Pj), as a 
linear function of the grand mean of all such probabilities, γ0, plus random deviations from this 
average for each group, U0j . 
 
 logit(Pj) = γ0 + U0j  (7)  
 
Next, we wish to test whether the likelihood of participating in choice is dependant upon the 
academic performance of the student measured the year prior to when the choice decision would 
take effect. When there are different likelihoods for high achievers versus low achievers, we refer to 
this as process as “skimming”. To test whether “skimming” is occurring with regard to test 
performance, 5th grade reading and math scores were added as covariates to Model 7. This model is 
given in Equation 8. 
 
 logit(Pij) = γ0 + γ1READij + γ2MATHij + ξ0j  (8)  
 
Lastly, we extended the model of Equation 8 to include a fixed factor for ethnicity. This 
inclusion allows one to test whether or not “skimming” is occurring with regard to the ethnicity. 
Because there are so few African American and Native American students in the district, we restrict 
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reporting, but not analysis, to Asian, Hispanic, and White students. This model is given by Equation 
9. The estimates of the model indicate whether the likelihood of participating in choice is dependent 
upon the ethnicity of the student. 
 
logit(Pij) = γ0 + γ1READij + γ2MATHij + γ3ETHNICITYij + ξ0j  (9)  
Results 
Results from an examination of school choice and student achievement were interesting. 
The baseline results for Model 1 are presented in Table 1. Here again, level-one represents occasion, 
level-two represents students, and level three represents schools. As one would expect, most of the 
variability (66.4% in math and 66.9% in reading) in the observed scores is at the student level. At the 
school level in math and reading the amount of variability accounted for is 13.3% and 13.7%, 
respectively. 
Extending Model 1 to include a covariate for time (Models 2 and 3), not surprisingly, 
provided a much better fit for the data. Model 3, which allows for differing growth rates between 
both students and schools provided a significantly better fit than Model 2, which allowed for 
differing growth rates between students and fixed growth rates for schools. In particular, for Model 
3, -2LogLikelihood for Math and Reading were 40,799.720 and 38,965.620, respectively, whereas the 
values derived for Model 2 (which estimates two fewer parameters) were 40,815.540 and 38,982.190, 
respectively. 
 
Table 1 
Parameter estimates for Model 1, math and reading exams 
 Math Reading 
Fixed Effects Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
γ000 547.0 6.4 645.9 5.1 
Random Effects Var. Comp. S.E. Var. Comp. S.E. 
Level-three (school) effects 
var(ν00k) 703.9 248.9 451.1 159.1 
Level-two (student) effects 
var(ζ0jk) 3525.9 133.1 2197.9 82.3 
Level-one (occasion) 
effects: var(εijk) 1078.5 35.2 633.5 20.7 
-2LogLikelihood 41319.0  39353.6  
 
Models 4 and 5 add a fixed effect for choice and differ with regard to their allowance for 
variable growth rates between three different choice groups (chooser who left (CL), choosers who 
stayed (CS), and non-choosers (NC)). The results are given in Table 2. The most important point to 
be derived form the results presented is that Model 5 was not significantly better at fitting the data 
than Model 5(the difference in -2LogLikelihood between the two models for math and reading were 
1.44 and 0.05, respectively) indicating that allowing equal growth rates of the three choice groups is 
not a hypothesis that can be rejected. This is evident given the very slight change in the variance 
components between the models within each subject. That is, the addition of choice status does not 
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help account for any of the residual variance associated with the model at across the student or 
school level. Overall, the results of Models 4 and 5 together confirm that there is no benefit to the 
academic performance of students that can be associated with their choice status in the district in the 
first year. 
 
Table 2 
Parameter estimates for Models 4 and 5 for math and reading exams 
 Math Reading 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5 
Fixed Effects Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
γ000 532.7 6.7 532.7 6.7 635.1 5.2 635.0 5.2
γ100 22.3 1.7 22.5 1.9 14.7 1.4 14.9 1.5
γ010 CL 7.7 4.5 7.8 4.6 9.2 3.5 9.6 3.8
γ010 CS 9.5 9.8 12.5 10.1 10.7 7.7 11.6 8.4
γ110 CLxGrade — — -0.1 2.6 — — -0.5 2.2
γ110 CSxGrade — — -7.6 6.3 — — -1.4 5.0
Random Effects 
Var. 
Comp. S.E. 
Var. 
Comp. S.E. 
Var. 
Comp. S.E. 
Var. 
Comp. S.E. 
Level-3 school 
effects 
        
var(ν00k) 733.4 259.5 734.9 260.3 436.3 156.3 433.9 155.6
var(ν1k) 34.5 17.3 35.6 17.8 22.2 11.0 22.4 11.1
cov(ν00k, ν1k) -88.4 52.7 -89.9 53.5 -58. 1 33.3 -56.6 33.3
Level-2 student 
effects 
        
var(ζ0jk) 4273.8 138.9 4272.6 138.9 2963.1 96.4 2963.8 96.4
var(ζ1jk) 1623.8 53.3 1624.3 53.2 1011.2 33.2 1012.1 33.2
cov(ζ0jk, ζ1jk) -589.3 62.5 -589.0 62.5 -656.0 42.9 -656.8 42.9
Level-1 occasion 
effects 
        
var(εijk) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-2LogLikelihood 40796.0  40794.6  38957.5  38957.5  
 
Building on Model 4 and 5, the final model used to examine school choice and student 
achievement, Model 6, incorporates a fixed effect denoting the quartile of academic performance the 
student reached in the 5th grade, prior to their choice/non-choice. Including this term allows for an 
examination of whether choice helps/hinders students at some performance levels that are masked 
by the overall results of Model 3. Results of this model for both math and reading are presented in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Grade 5 to grade 6 math and reading growth estimates for non-choosers (NC), 
choosers leaving (CL), and choosers staying (CS) by quartile 
 
The “gold-standard” comparison is between the choosers who left (CL) and the choosers 
who stayed (CS) since both groups are equivalent in the fact that they requested to leave their 
neighborhood schools. Because the number of CS students is small (most students that participate 
in choice get some school option which they take), the differences in growth rates between the CS 
and CL groups, though large in some cases, are not statistically significant. Comparisons between 
non-choosers (NC) and CL yielded interesting and statistically significant results. In particular, with 
regard to the math test, those students in the 1st quartile who chose out of their neighborhood 
school demonstrated significantly better performance on the sixth grade math test than did their 
counterparts who stayed. In the 2nd and 4th quartiles this ordering was reversed: students choosing 
out of their neighborhood schools who left performed significantly worse than did their 
counterparts who stayed. The results in reading demonstrated less difference between the three 
groups. There were no significant differences between the growth rates of the three groups in each 
of the four quartiles. Overall, the results suggest that no broad claims can be made about the efficacy 
of choice on student academic achievement as measured by the state assessment. 
Results of the examination of patterns of student enrollment with regard to choice status 
indicate “skimming” is occurring. The logistic regression model of Equation 8 yields coefficients 
that were significant and positive for reading but not significantly different than zero for math. 
Specifically, γ1 = 0.00103 (0.00117) and γ2 = 0.00517 (0.00146). Thus, the probability of participating 
in choice increase as the student’s fifth grade reading score increases. In a choice system with no 
“skimming”, one would expect to see no relationship between student ability and their participation 
in choice. It is unclear why reading yielded a significant coefficient but not math. Certainly more data 
is necessary to draw long term conclusions about skimming, a likely result is movement towards 
higher concentrations of high ability students at certain schools and higher concentration of low 
ability students at other schools—tracking-at-large so to speak. 
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When looking at patterns of student enrollment including ethnicity as a factor some 
interesting results arise. Figure 2 presents the results of the analyses associated with Equation 9. 
Across all score levels, Asian students demonstrated a significantly higher probability of participating 
in choice than did Hispanic or White students. There was virtually no difference between White and 
Hispanic students with regard to their probability of participation. The results imply, at least in terms 
of those people choosing to participate in the choice system, that “skimming” based upon ethnicity 
is not occurring in the district given the relatively small number of Asian students in the sample. 
Just as the previous results present a complicated picture of what the consequences of choice 
in the district are, results from the survey administered to parents in the district also indicate that the 
motivations behind the parents’ decision to participate or not in school choice are nuanced. 
Specifically we found that parents, when asked about the importance of assessment based school 
ratings in the decision of where to send their child, did not value the school-level test results as 
highly as other factors including safety and school curriculum. Parents participating in school choice 
did value school report cards and the test based information significantly more than did those 
parents not participating in school choice, but for both groups, there were other non-testing factors 
that were reported to be more important in their decision making process. 
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Figure 2: Probability of participating in choice based upon 5th grade reading scores and ethnicity  
 
This is partly consistent with results derived from district choice data showing what schools 
are most popular. When looking at middle schools, where test data is available and parental 
influence is greatest on the school the student attends, the most requested middle schools for choice 
are those schools with the highest report card ratings. Thus, it appears based upon both survey data 
and patterns of choice in the district, that test scores do play a significant role in the decision making 
On School Choice and Test-Based Accountability 15 
process of parents. But, there are other considerations that trump test score results in the parents’ 
overall decision. 
Conclusion 
In this study we have examined arguments concerning school choice and its relation to test-
based accountability in three ways: By examining how choice affects student achievement as 
measured by statewide achievement tests in math and reading, by examining how choice affects 
patterns of student enrollment across schools in the district as measured by statewide assessments, 
and by examining how choice is informed by results of statewide assessment that are reported in 
school report cards. 
With regard to the assertions put forward by the proponents and opponents of choice, 
taking the district we examined as a crucible of choice this paper lends greater support to the 
contentions of opponents of choice than the proponents:  
There was not a uniform benefit on student test scores for those students participating in 
choice. Thus, the contention that allowing choice will help academic achievement is not supported 
by our findings. In fact, the only students in our study who showed a positive benefit from choice 
were those students from the lowest quartile. But their increase was only demonstrated on the math 
test. It was not confirmed by their performance on the reading test. 
Our results suggest that “skimming” by ability is occurring in the district. This result may go 
some way to explaining why, when simple descriptive statistics are analyzed at, it appears that 
schools with a high amount of choice do well. These schools may be equal in quality to other, less 
desirous schools in the district, but the pool of students from which they draw is highly able, leading 
some to wrongly believe that it is the school that is responsible for these children’s scores. 
Parents’ decisions about what schools to send their children to are not uniformly directed by 
test scores alone. This is true for both parents participating in choice and those who don’t. There are 
many factors that influence parental attitudes about schools including reputation, safety, location, 
school where the child’s friends will attend, and curriculum. 
In future work we hope to extend the current analyses to include more years of data that will 
shed light on what the longer term effects of choice are. The examination of choice and its impact 
upon achievement and patterns of student enrollment should be central to any discussion about the 
efficacy of choice in the public education system. It is our hope that similar examinations to ours 
will be carried out in others districts with school choice systems in place so that a more complete 
picture is available of this burgeoning phenomenon. In that way we all can better understand 
whether school choice does truly improve education in the United States. 
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